France’s car industry goes to war

France is no longer discussing the war economy only in political speeches. The shift is now reaching factories, especially the automotive sector, which is under pressure from electrification, Chinese competition and years of job losses. Defence is becoming not only a matter of sovereignty, but also a possible lifeline for French industrial sites, subcontractors and workers. As Le Monde points out, the French automotive sector lost one third of its workforce between 2010 and 2023, and another 75,000 jobs could disappear by 2035. This explains why defence is increasingly seen inside factories not as a controversial sector, but as one of the few areas where production is unlikely to be offshored and where the state needs to preserve skills, supply chains and industrial capacity. The war in Ukraine changed the language and the logic. Ten or fifteen years ago, defence contracts were often seen as reputationally difficult, including by banks and corporate social responsibility circles. Today, the same companies speak openly about defence as a growth sector. HBP, a small industrial group in the Arve Valley with 130 employees, shows this transformation well. Automotive once represented 60% of its activity. Today it is only 6%. Defence, which used to be absent, now represents 15% and is growing. Renault is the most symbolic case. The company, in which the French state still holds around 15%, is preparing a workshop at its Le Mans plant to assemble a large drone for Turgis Gaillard. This follows the defence aerial drones pact launched by the Ministry of the Armed Forces in June 2024 to increase the production pace. The logic is simple: classic defence companies have advanced technologies, but automotive has industrial rhythm, quality control, supply-chain management and experience in large-scale manufacturing. Valeo is studying the possibility of producing electric motors for drones in France, instead of relying on imports from China. Scania wants to accelerate military truck production at its Angers plant, which already works for the French army. It is expected to deliver more than 100 Vampire vehicles this year and has an order book of around 350 military vehicles. This allows Scania to use its civilian heavy-truck assembly line more efficiently while supporting military production. The same trend is visible in more fragile industrial sites. Walor Bordeaux, the former Ford plant in Blanquefort, is actively looking for diversification projects, including defence. The French procurement agency, DGA, visited the site in 2025, and contacts were made with Ukrainian drone manufacturers. In Montluçon, Amis is also studying a move into defence after restructuring and job cuts. For these companies, defence is not ideology. It is orders, survival and industrial continuity. This is why the automotive sector is becoming important for France’s war economy. Many subcontractors are under pressure from electrification, lower activity and Chinese competition. Defence offers something different: production less likely to be offshored, better recognition of industrial skills and a direct link with national sovereignty. France Travail estimates that between 70,000 and 100,000 jobs will need to be filled in the defence sector by 2030. This is a major signal. Defence is not only absorbing state money. It is becoming a labour market. However, this transition is difficult. Automotive and defence are not the same world. Automotive works with large volumes, standardisation and cost pressure. Defence works with smaller series, stronger state control, security rules, cybersecurity requirements, certification, export restrictions and complex DGA procedures. A factory cannot simply move from civilian components to military production in a few months. It needs orders, investment, certification, secure supply chains and a clear long-term market. This is exactly where Macron’s war economy is being tested. Since 2022, the French President has repeatedly called for an économie de guerre. The 2024–2030 Military Programming Law is worth €413 billion. Defence orders reached €20 billion in 2023, clearly above the annual average recorded between 2012 and 2022. France has also increased Rafale production from two to three aircraft per month, with the ambition to reach five. But Macron himself admitted in January 2026 that France is still not truly in a war economy. The drone sector is where this problem is most visible. Macron himself admitted that France is late, while Ukraine has become the benchmark for wartime innovation. In 2025, Ukraine produced drones in the millions, while France still operates at a scale measured in thousands. This shows the difference between a country producing under the pressure of war and a state still trying to move a highly regulated industrial system faster. For Paris, this is not only a technological problem. It is a question of production culture, procurement tempo and the ability to accept that mass now matters as much as quality. The state understands this and the parliamentary report on the French war economy pointed to the need to secure supply chains, relocate critical production and reduce dependence on foreign suppliers for materials such as titanium, steel and powder for large-calibre ammunition. Moving powder production back to Bergerac is part of this logic. France wants strategic autonomy, but autonomy is not declared. It is produced. The real question is whether this can happen fast enough. France has excellent defence companies: Dassault, MBDA, Safran, Thales, KNDS France and Naval Group. But a war economy cannot rely only on national champions. It needs SMEs, subcontractors, automotive plants, electronics firms, mechanics, logistics, software and workers who can move between civilian and military production. If France wants mass, it needs the civilian industrial base. This is a major test for Macron and for the French state. Defence can become a lifeline for parts of the automotive sector, but only if contracts are real, financing is secured and the state accepts that a war economy requires more than speeches. It requires production lines, workers, stockpiles, components and the ability to deliver quickly. Otherwise, France will remain a country with strong military ambitions, but an industrial system still working too much at a peacetime rhythm.